

Existence Beyond Condition

This text is excerpted from a forthcoming anthology of newly translated writings by Kishio Suga, edited by Andrew Maerkle and published by Skira Editore and Blum & Poe.

Introduction by Andrew Maerkle

In 1970 *Bijutsu Techō* dedicated the featured content of its February issue to the voices of emerging artists. Subjects included Susumu Koshimizu, Lee Ufan, Katsuhiko Narita, Nobuo Sekine, Katsuro Yoshida, and Suga, who all appeared together in a roundtable discussion.¹ The year prior, in 1969, these artists had made their mark at major exhibitions, such as the 9th Contemporary Art Exhibition of Japan at the Tokyo Metropolitan Art Museum and the annual *Trends in Contemporary Art* exhibition at the National Museum of Modern Art, Kyoto. Not participating in either, Suga was the lone exception, although his solo exhibition in October 1969 at Tamura Gallery, where he presented the work *Parallel Strata*, caught the eye of influential critics such as Toshiaki Minemura.

Indeed, Suga was on the cusp of his breakthrough. Later in 1970, he would be included in *Trends in Contemporary Art* in Kyoto, as well as another important annual survey, the *Artists Today* exhibition organized by the Yokohama Civic Art Gallery, and *August 1970: Aspects of New Japanese Art* at the National Museum of Modern Art, Tokyo. Additionally, he won the grand prize at the 5th Japan Art Festival exhibition, which traveled to the Guggenheim Museum in New York under the title *Contemporary Japanese Art*. It was a sign of things to come, then, that Suga was chosen to contribute one of two long essays that led the roundtable, the other being Lee Ufan's "In Search of Encounter."²

Full of dense rhetoric, "Existence beyond Condition" is one of Suga's most challenging texts to unpack. As with his other essays from this period, we find him launching an attack on international trends such as Conceptual art, Minimalism, Neo-Dada, and Pop, which he implies are overly in thrall to ideas and "data." He further extends his critique to his older Japanese peers Shūsaku Arakawa, called out by name in a quick aside, and Jirō Takamatsu, who is alluded to through a long riff on two works, *Slack of Cloth* and *Stones and Numerals* (both 1969). Whereas Suga merely chides Arakawa for suddenly changing styles after moving to the United States, he is particularly severe with Takamatsu, implying that the latter is behind the times and has no clue what he is doing.

The central theme of the essay develops from a linguistic distinction between three different representations of the verb *aru* (to be, to have): (1) as written in hiragana script, ある (being [there]); (2) as written with the Chinese character *yū*, 有る (which emphasizes a sense of having or being given); and (3) as written with the Chinese character *zai*, 在る (which emphasizes a sense of being present or situated). Each distinction is used to identify a different level of being for things: (1) a found being; (2) a mediated being; and (3) an unmediated being. (Below, translator Mika Yoshitake distinguishes the latter two as “presence” and “existence.”) It is the task of the artist to help things achieve the third state of being—a state of existence beyond condition—which in Suga’s estimation neither the celebrated American nor the derivative Japanese artists really get. This is the first appearance of the emphatic *mono* (〈もの〉), rendered as “[thing],” in contrast to the Chinese character *mono/butsu* 物, rendered as “object[thing].”

1. Kishio Suga, et al., “Tokushū—Hatsugen suru shinjin tachi: ‘Mono’ ga hiraku atarashii seikai” [Special feature—Newcomers making statements: The new world opened by “things”], *Bijutsu Techō*, no. 324 (February 1970): 34–55. See Suga, et al., “Voices of Emerging Artists: ‘Mono’ Opens a New World,” trans. Oshrat Dotan, James Jack, and Mika Yoshitake, in Yoshitake, *Requiem for the Sun: The Art of Mono-ha*, exh. cat. (Los Angeles: Blum & Poe), 211–217, for the English.

2. Lee Ufan, “Deai o motomete,” *Bijutsu Techō*, no. 324 (February 1970): 14–23. Lee would revise the essay for subsequent collections of his writings. An English version can be found in the catalogue for Lee’s retrospective at the Guggenheim Museum in New York in 2011. See Lee, “In Search of Encounter,” trans. Stanley N. Anderson, in Alexandra Munroe et al., *Lee Ufan: Marking Infinity*, exh. cat. (New York: Guggenheim Museum, 2011), 113–18.

Translated by Mika Yoshitake

When we happen to climb to a high place far from ground level, we sense more the fear that comes from our bodies not being supported, or from not having a single thing to support our bodies, than the fear that comes from our sensation of the height—and that is when we can perceive it as a *place that is high*. As there is no change to our standing on our feet, it feels as though we should be able to jump or hop around freely, but since there's nothing but void some feet¹ beneath the scaffolding, it means, when you think about it, that our freedom is being controlled by there being nothing there.

And there is no better place for sensing the earth than a high place. On the earth we are able to stand straight and walk without anything to hold on to. Even if we were to fall at any instant, we would fall no further than our own height, so we do not particularly need to grab on to something to support our body.

Looking at and drafting architectural designs or plans for large-scale machinery are great necessities for those who fabricate some kind of object[thing], but it's not necessarily that those plans precisely indicate the spatial enormity of the buildings or machines that actually get built or the sureness of the materials that actually get used. To put it extremely, even where the signs in the plans indicate stone or steel, glass wool or polyurethane board, it would be hard to conceive of a single fixed thing-object in our minds aside from what we already know by the semiotic conventions for those materials. Even if we could, they would be reduced object[thing]s, all enframed in or assembled out of object[thing]s flimsy as paper. The perceptions we hold about individual materials must inherently differ from the materials as actually combined.

Arguments about whether plans are complete in themselves can only stand on the perspective that the actual result and its plan are things of completely differing dimensions. Minimalist or constructivist artworks almost always require plans, with the artists adjusting the resulting works to fit the plans precisely by feeding them back into the plans, which means that this process controls the base actions we do without realizing. Usually, spectators will be left with the mysterious question mark of sensing something wrong or wondering what they're seeing in response to incalculable human errors. The greater the gap between plan and actual result, the more we inevitably get taken in by the artist's intention. The tendency to put up or present plans or diagrams in the same place as the object[thing] after it is made was trendy two or three years ago,

but all that did was to completely disregard people's conceptualization or imagination. In other words, insofar as it governed the freedom of spectators' thoughts toward the thing that was actually there, it was probably a natural consequence that recent artworks should be presented as representations of conceptualization itself.

As long as we think a plan should be the precondition or process for fabricating some kind of visual artwork, the plan can never be completed, nor is there any need to display it. It is only when a plan is not visualized as any representation, or there is no meaning to its being visualized, that the plan is able to gain independence as a plan. If plans were simply diagrams, mathematical formulas, or symbols that could easily be given form by us, we would have no need to go on and fabricate the object[thing]s.

The moment the planning operation's shift from the imaginative process into visual representation gets normalized, we lose the reason for showing the plan. That we have to deny the creative process in order for it to become an important starting point must be a great irony for those who want to *create object[thing]s*.

Even if the symbols, lines, or figures drawn in the temporal process of drafting a plan are drawn to indicate thing-objects or phenomena that must be real, or that are expected to be so in the near future, they are just the semioticization or schematization of imaginary phenomena, and not the semioticization or schematization of something in reality. All that happens is that these made-up imaginary symbols and diagrams, which are free and nonbinding, get turned into imaginary symbols and diagrams that *are binding*.

With the introduction to Japan of Neo-Dada and New York Pop artists² such as Jasper Johns, Robert Rauschenberg, Claes Oldenburg, or Tom Wesselmann entering the 1960s, a certain art critic³ who came back from the United States told us how all the artists there carefully keep vast amounts of memos and notes that they don't want to show to others. But once we realize that the United States is a better place for realizing ideas than it is for thinking up forms, we can see how these vast amounts of memos and notes have served to isolate each artmaker from the other, and how these artmakers have continued to invoke America and the consciousness of being American within themselves by each possessing some form that is theirs alone.

These vast amounts of memos and notes were not being written only for fabricating object[thing]s, and were more for the artmakers to notice something out of all the things in everyday life that strongly affected their feelings and then try to classify it in their own way, with sculptural

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objects or two-dimensional canvases only happening to be employed as the last step in that classification. To put it more explicitly, it's not that the memos were necessary for the mentality of fabricating object[thing]s, but that creation came to be born out of this unique concept of memos for American artists. From the viewpoint that they should be called appeals to society, to humanity, and to the self, these vast memos have secured an utterly indispensable position for Johns, Rauschenberg, and others.

We could say these vast memos are the outcome of a cognitive process in response to American civilization and ideology, say, or even the entirety of Western thought. The “vast memos” are an important key for tearing down ideational thinking or overly formalized ways of seeing object[thing]s: they are meant not for fabricating but for *destroying*.

That someone like Shūsaku Arakawa, who was working on creepy coffin-like things when he was in Japan, should suddenly convert to doing diagram art once he got to the US implicitly demonstrates the differences between Eastern and Western ways of thinking.

Young Japanese artists are busy promoting themselves carrying around their inordinately thick notepads and whatnot, but I have doubts about whether future artists should really let their cheap memos be publicized. When we write memos, we always do so on the premise of fabricating some kind of visual object[thing]. As long as they are a means of pursuit toward object[thing]s, toward the spatiality or temporality of object[thing]s as mediums, memos will only have a secondary value for artmaking.

If memos or *data* really are necessary for you, then you've got to change something. Where the Americans needed their memos or *data* for changing society, for changing themselves, we lost our reason for having memos the moment we became conscious of fabricating object[thing]s, and so have had to work directly to change object[thing]s in themselves.

We take photos to retain the traces of the finished artwork, but these days we don't preserve what we make—or instead of don't, it might more accurately be said we can't preserve it. The moment a work is made, it sure *is there*, but as we begin to lose our conscious awareness toward the object[thing], thing-objects break down and there is a shift from a state of *presence* toward a condition of *existence*.⁴ Compared to the state of a thing-object's just being there, the state of *presence* puts more emphasis on the presence or absence of ideational thinking through the thing-object's state of *presence*. Which means the state of *presence* is not a thing-object just actually being there without manipulation, but the state of the object[thing] that emerges after some

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form of operation has been applied to the thing-object by artificial modification or by use of an act/actions or technique, while *existence* is none other than the true being there of the thing-object that is actually visible to us, encompassing time and space and the object[thing]'s immutability.

The state of *presence* is something that is secondarily produced by people, which connects to the mentality of fabricating object[thing]s. Prior to the perception of *presence* it of course has the state of *absence* at its other extreme, and there necessarily needs to be a visual element to go from a state of *absence* to a state of *presence*. If the state of *presence* is the foundation for an artwork to be visualized, then it makes sense that the state of *absence* should be part of the process of fabricating a nonvisualized object[thing].

As long as our perception of fabricating object[thing]s stands on the perception that "something has to be present," we will continue to believe unquestioningly in *what is present* as element. And we will never produce a new object[thing] for another dimension unless we destroy the material concept of an object[thing] that has been made by someone using various materials.

We move from an imaginary world to an actual world by imagining a state of *presence*. Thus: Clearly our perception of something *being present* cannot get away from our perception of fabricating something. On top of which, even once the idealization or presentation is over, we still cannot destroy the remnant due to our perception of having a fabricated object[thing] there.

In the perception of thing-objects *existing*, something is obviously there, and the state of its *not existing* is inconceivable. That is, it *is there* irrevocably outside of artificial constraints, which is to say at the point where it completely disregards our creation. But whereas something's *presence* is the perception of its state, its *existence* is the very perception of its quantitatively being there in itself. Sadistic traits like refashioning something to make it new or else making something into a *unique piece*⁵ by ramming a feel of realness into some kind of structural framework are obliterated in the perception of *existing*.

We could say that the very state of *existence* is the most individualistic and *unique* mode of being as such for us. The clue for people to transcend their mentality of fabricating object[thing]s is to convert something *present* into that object[thing]'s extreme limit state of *existence*, to shift the general state of being of object[thing]s that we normally perceive to a state in which each *exists* in isolation.

Artists at the very least have to begin by breaking free from the latent mentality or ideality of fabricating some kind of object[thing]. It requires a human act as intermediary to understand the

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shift from an object[thing]'s general state of being to the *state of existing* at its extreme limit. Say an artmaker were to put a large stone on a steel plate.⁶ We would know that object[thing] and object[thing], object[thing] and person had obtained a shared dimension ([field]site) by the property of the act of putting one object[thing] on top of another object[thing]. Going a step further, if there were some necessity that steel and stone should never be placed separately, then it would be the properties of the state of the one object[thing] and of the other that make it so.

Suppose there were a piece of lumber. If you were to make it stand by some means, it would not be the same as the state of its standing there without any intervention. To make it stand is not about the process of fabricating an object[thing] so much as it is a change to its fundamental mode of being as object[thing], as it might be more natural for the lumber to be on its side, or buried in the ground, or split in two. In light of the precondition of the lumber's standing, we could say that to make it stand is the reduction and abstraction of the property of the object[thing]'s mode of being that is standing to the property of the human act of making it stand. But the state of the lumber manifestly standing in place without human intervention is its maintaining the state of its standing, whether it stands with some support or without support, which concerns itself with the basic property of the object[thing]'s standing mode of being. And at this point something like someone's act ultimately adhering to the object[thing] and leaving a trace on it should almost never come by the idea of *fabricating* something.

Ordinarily people don't have any perception of repeating the same movements even when they repeat the same kind of movement multiple times. Because even with the same movements, even if the situations, objects,⁷ methods were ultimately the same when you did the movements, they would still have different characters. That an object[thing] actually appears in some form even when we don't have the mentality of fabricating an object[thing] is because we can't avoid the repeating pattern of actions inducing an object[thing].

There is an artist who slackened cloth and wrote numbers on stones so as to have a minimal interaction with object[thing]s, but this was perversely an attitude of maximum interaction with them.⁸ Even when not especially slackened by hand, cloth will get itself wrinkled or pick up dirt, stretch and contract. But in more baldly making the surface of his cloth overly overtly slack, the artist produced a state of cloth that could only ever be done by manipulation. For a cloth to be stretched is a natural condition of the cloth itself as it were, while to introduce an unnatural looseness into this natural perception is to alter the originary premise behind the cloth, and insofar as he can only express that through the cloth, the artist is maximally fixated on the object[thing].

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Sometimes people cannot see the true substance of an object[thing] even when its form exists right before them in reality. For the state of *existence* has no part that is signified, whereas marking numbers on stones is the signification of *existence* itself. And yet our artist shows no doubts about the modes of *how something exists*. I don't know whether he perceived the stones' state as being something to be marked by numbers, but even if he had some absolute principle for the numbers to be marked, it would mean he unconsciously believes that numerical signs engage all people with equal weight. If numbers were object[thing]s for private use that we used on our own, then certainly they might fulfill their role as signs. Say you had some numbers and you had some stones, and numbers had the property that they should be for marking something, while stones had the property that they should be marked by something, then certainly there might be room for you to minimally intervene between stone and number at the moment of writing the number down, but as long as there is no necessity of being for the numbers to be for marking and the stones to be as they should, then we have to admit it's a completely meaningless act even before we speak of minimal engagements.

When an object[thing] manifests an unchanging state of *existence*, it will come with a person's act—but not as a means, as it is by the coupling of the unchanging elements of the act itself and the changeable elements of the object[thing] that the object[thing] displays the unchanging state of *existing as it has to be*. But we are not able to observe the object[thing]'s unchangeability in itself. If we want to further know the object[thing]'s unchangeable aspects, we have to break down the idea of the object[thing]'s being real.

People observe an object[thing] *as if it were present*. On the contrary, they can also observe an object[thing] *as if it were not present even when it is*. The artworks done in trompe l'oeil or "Tricks and Vision"⁹ that were in vogue a year ago could not be continued because they neglected the reality perception that the object[thing] substance on which an object[thing]'s transformation is predicated actually exists.

At current artworks are still being fabricated while having to put up the same as always with the ridiculous monikers of *art*, from Conceptual art to Natural art or Air art.¹⁰ But for us artwork is work that has no purposeness, is doing nothing more than the work of work. Work has the definition of only doing something once there is a purpose, whereas our work maintains its position as work in its being *work* that is undefinable as such, in its being purposeless.

The reason it was first necessary to get rid of our fabricating consciousness in fabricating [thing]s is that otherwise we could only grasp the object¹¹ as an objective reality¹² through a view of

[thing]s that puts ourselves as the subject. Before *observing* we have to first catch the object in the moment it stands with us, the moment of its *existing in the way it exists*. In the objectivity of observing, we can know the [thing]'s *mode of being* only through the unilateral view that it is the person who *observes* the [thing]. This means that unless we can have a perception of a [thing] that keeps in mind its being as [thing], we can only ever catch the [thing] in a state when it is not the [thing] itself.

In denying a [thing] with a [thing], we realize that [thing] and [thing] are equivalent, have equal positions. Although it's true we try to represent the kinds of things that get called "ideas" with [thing]s, is the object[thing] we are trying to present really ideational thinking in itself? No. When a [thing] becomes a nonobjective object,¹³ all we know is a [thing] that is a substance as nonobjective object.

One method of denying a [thing] with a [thing] is to present the innate qualities of the [thing]s as *phenomena* that only they can represent. For example, making the [thing]s function where they get discounted by crossing their respective qualities, as by cracking glass with a stone or placing metal on top of rubber. But such phenomena differ from spontaneously occurring phenomena in that the impetus for the *phenomenon* to occur is backed by the unexpectedness of something happening unhappily, and the [thing]'s persistence in its state continuing for as long as allowed without spontaneously disappearing. Then there's the physical effect of when the *phenomenon* occurs, which means that when it comes to making the *phenomenon* disappear, there needs to be an act/effect of equal weight. Ordinarily people know the property that glass has of cracking or that rubber has of stretching and shriveling, which is the only way they are prepared to have a shared conceptual [field]site with glass or rubber, but when glass cracks under the weight of a stone or rubber is squashed by metal,¹⁴ they lose the [field]site for connecting to them as concepts even though glass that has gotten cracked or rubber that has gotten stretched out and shriveled up is right there before their eyes. Thus we need to come up with completely new and unknown conceptions for them as *that thing that is cracked* or *that thing that is squashed*. In other words, we find a [field]site for encountering something new where [thing]s are no longer [thing]s to each other.

Another method of seeking out *unknown* [thing]s is the practice of using homogeneous materials to transform the masses, forms, volumes, or temporalities, spatialities, materialities of the [thing]s to present the sensibility of their being obviously *different things*. In the case of the *phenomenon*, we simultaneously converted heterogeneous materials into a state of being entangled and reciprocal, but with homogeneous [thing]s the object of interaction is only the

object[thing] in itself, subject and object¹⁵ homogenize, and the [thing] as such exists as a thing-object to be seen along with a sensation. It of course entails a deliberate act¹⁶ and the application of mechanical processes for this *thing that exists* to appear. But that's not enough for it to be an issue for us. Essentially, all it takes is to have a perception of its mode of being, of its being transformed and definitely being there.

One thing that has been defined and known destroys another given thing, transforms into yet another given thing. From one reality to another reality, a [thing] attempts its transformation as [thing] where there is no getting away from the [thing] concept for the [thing].

From a world of fiction to one of reality, from phantom to substance, idea to substance, and vice versa. We always thought about how to represent while taking something in relation as a measure. It's only now we learn that [thing]s have started assuming the will to deny all that through the measure of the [thing] itself—whereas once an idea puts [thing] and [thing], *intent and nonintent*¹⁷ on the balance, we already fall into the ill of the outmoded creative thinking that we *must fabricate* something.

If not only people but *everything* had a critical mind, then a [thing] should be able to critique people, should be able to critique [thing]s themselves. If the mentality of fabricating a [thing] is some kind of demonstration of resistance, then you should know that the [thing] that comes out of it explicitly takes as its object of critique even you, the one who fabricated it—critiques your, say, creative mentality or function, as well as, say, the act/actions that parallel it. It is in blindly believing in the things we fabricate that we are unable to discern the essences of [thing]s, the essences of *acts*, the *observing essence*, the essence of *perceiving*.

Once the creative act took on a single theorem, we had to look for a new methodology for beating the theorem. The way of turning a [thing] you think in your head into a medium had already gotten to where it spontaneously collapsed under the finitude of the idea, under its loss of *real* feeling. And all that gradually fishing ideas out of the undercurrent and incrementally altering their representation does is to meaninglessly adjust yourself to the theorem, as though to prove some long antiquated philosophy.

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TRANSLATOR'S NOTES

1. The Japanese makes reference to *shaku* 尺, a unit of measurement that has fallen into disuse in Japan with the introduction of the metric system, but still retains a strong idiomatic presence. One *shaku* is roughly equivalent to one foot.—(AM)
2. The *Bijutsu Techō* version only mentions New York Pop. Neo-Dada was an addition to the Yokohama anthology.—(AM)
3. A reference to Yoshiaki Tōno, a prominent art critic and curator who introduced postwar American art to Japanese readers through articles such as “Amerika no bijutsukai” [America’s art world], *Yomiuri Shimbun*, August 25, 1959. Tōno traveled through Europe, the United States, and Mexico in 1958–59. Fond of mentioning his closeness to artists like Jasper Johns and Robert Rauschenberg in his texts, he later published a book on postwar American art and his travels in the United States in 1966–68, *Amerika: Kyojō baiyō koku shi* [America: Journal from the land of virtual-image cultivation] (Tokyo: Bijutsu Shuppan, 1968).—(AM/MY)
4. “In ‘Existence Beyond Condition’ (1970), Suga distinguishes between two models of the object’s being: its ‘presence’ (有る) versus its mode of ‘existence’ (在る). The former involves the object’s actual physical presence based on the artist’s intentionality and realization of a concept. This would correspond to a subject-oriented model that hypostasizes the presence of human thought. The latter comprises an object-oriented model where such ideation has been eliminated and emphasizes the object’s ontological existence in actual space and time. The ultimate model of ‘existence’ would comprise an untreated natural object that exists as an unnamed condition. . . . Suga is trying to seek out ways to maintain this nameless entity that extends beyond linguistic signification and the subject’s fundamental desire to ‘produce’ objects. His project would seem thus to involve displacing the idea of ‘presence’ by showing the process in which an object exists within a total field (‘existence’).” Mika Yoshitake, “Lee Ufan and the Art of Mono-ha in Postwar Japan (1968–1972)” (PhD diss., University of California, Los Angeles, 2012), 153–54.—(MY)

5. *Yunīku na shiromono* ユニークなしろもの. In Japanese the loanword *yunīku* is weighted more to the sense of being “peculiar” or “unusual” than being the “sole” or “only one.” Here Suga seems to be using it ironically in the pejorative.—(AM)

6. Here and following, Suga is clearly thinking of Lee Ufan’s *Relatum* works, begun in 1968. In *Relatum* (formerly *Phenomena and Perception B*) (1969), Lee drops a large stone on a pane of glass—itsself placed on top of a steel plate—that cracks under the weight of the stone. Other works in the series include *Relatum* (formerly *Phenomena and Perception A*) (1969), in which three large stones are placed at different points on a length of black rubber that has been marked with measuring lines, distorting the distances between the measures; and *Relatum II (a place within a certain situation)* (1970), in which wood beams are placed standing free, leaning against a wall, and propped on top of each other in the exhibition space. The former two works are used as illustrations in the roundtable discussion that appears in the same issue of *Bijutsu Techō*. See Lee, Suga et al., “‘Mono’ ga hiraku atarashii sekai”: 45–46.—(AM)

7. *Taishō* 対象.—(AM)

8. A reference to Jirō Takamatsu and his works *Slack of Cloth* and *Stone and Numeral* (both 1969). A member of the seminal Neo-Dadaist collective Hi Red Center active in the early 1960s, Takamatsu was already investigating the “‘objection’ of every possible object in everyday life,” or the possibility of “liberating the object from a prescribed relation and making it the object of a new relation” (Takamatsu, “Fragmentary Texts,’ 1962–72” in Alexandra Munroe, *Japanese Art after 1945: Scream against the Sky*, exh. cat. [New York: Harry N. Abrams, 1994], 373–74). Takamatsu would exert an influence in particular on Suga’s peers Nobuo Sekine and Katsuhiko Narita, who worked for him as assistants on his project for the Japan Pavilion at the 34th Venice Biennale in 1968, and he eventually came to be identified with Mono-ha.—(AM)

9. A reference to the seminal *Tricks and Vision: Stolen Eyes* exhibition organized in 1968 at two Tokyo venues by critics Yūsuke Nakahara and Junzō Ishiko. The exhibition was held from April 30 to May 18 at Tokyo Gallery and April 30 to May 11 at Muramatsu Gallery. Takamatsu was one of the participants, alongside Etsutomu Kashiwara, Natsuyuki Nakanishi, Nobuo Sekine, and others. The exhibition is seen as an important precursor to what came to be known as Mono-ha. Many of the works incorporated trompe l’oeil motifs and other optical effects. Suga also makes a dismissive reference to *Tricks and Vision* in 1977’s “Logic of [Field]Site.”—(AM)

10. Such terms were introduced to Japanese readers through a two-part special feature on the theme of “The New Nature” in *Bijutsu Techō*’s June and July 1969 issues. The first part focused on Air art and the second part on Earthworks. See “Atarashii shizen—Erementarizumu 1: Ea āto,” special feature, *Bijutsu Techō*, no. 314 (June 1969), and “Atarashii shizen—Erementarizumu 2: Āsuwāku,” special feature, *Bijutsu Techō*, no. 315 (July 1969).—(AM)

11. Here and in the next sentence, *taishōbutsu* 対象物.—(AM)

12. *Kyakkanteki jitsuzai* 客観的実在. *Kyakkanteki* (objective) is used in contrast to *shukanteki* 主観的 (subjective).—(AM)

13. *Hitaishōbutsu* 非対象物.—(AM)

14. In addition to Lee Ufan's *Relatum* (formerly *Phenomena and Perception A*) (1969), the discussion of rubber being squashed by a metal plate here also evokes Nobuo Sekine's *Phase—Sponge* (1968), in which a large steel plate is placed on top of a block of white sponge-like material, which is squashed under the weight of the steel.—(AM)

15. *Shutai to kyakutai* 主体と客体.—(AM)

16. *Jin'iteki sakui* 人為的作為.—(AM)

17. *Sakui to fusakui* 作為と不作為. *Sakui's* primary meaning is something close to “creative intent,” although it accommodates diverse readings. For example, Arata Isozaki makes repeated reference to *sakui* as a concept in his book *Japan-ness in Architecture* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006). The translator Sabu Kohso generally renders the term as “artifice,” but at other points it is also associated with “intention,” “poesis,” and “invention.” *Fusakui* commonly appears as a legal term corresponding to the English “nonfeasance.”—(AM)